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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Sertel and O¨zkal-Sanver (2002), hereafter S & O¨-S, explained that in
two-sided matching models “... the consumption possibilities of an agent may depend on
the respective endowments of the pair in which the agent ends up under a matching” (S &
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O¨-S, p. 66). They endowed the classical marriage matching model (cf. Gale and Shapley
(1962)) with two additional features: endowments of some resource and consumption rules
which determine how endowments are consumed jointly, i.e., within a matched pair.
In their study of this extended model, S & O¨-S focused on the manipulability of
the man optimal matching rule ϕM (for the woman optimal matching rule one simply
changes the roles of men and women).4 More specifically, they considered four types
of manipulation: destruction, hiding, perfect hiding, and predonation of endowments.
Mostly under the assumption that there are at least three agents on each side of the
market, they characterized the class of consumption rules under which ϕM is vulnerable
to manipulation of any of the first three types. Regarding manipulation by predonation of
endowment, they only provided examples of matching markets to show that under several
‘natural’ consumption rules ϕM is prone to manipulation. Subsequently, S & O¨-S (p. 80)
posed a research question: Which are the maximal classes of consumption rules under
which ϕM can be manipulated via predonation of endowment?
In this paper we answer this question. We first characterize for any of the four cases
of predonation (i.e., man to woman, man to man, woman to man, and woman to woman)
the class of consumption rules under which ϕM is manipulable. We use conditions that
are very similar to the ones used by S & O¨-S, which make a clear comparison with their
characterizations possible. Finally, we derive from our characterization results that ϕM
is only non-manipulable under the trivial consumption rule, where each agent consumes
exactly his own endowment. (S & O¨-S already noted that at least under this consumption
rule, ϕM is non-manipulable.) The proofs of our characterizations are considerably differ-
ent from the proofs in S & O¨-S regarding destruction or (perfect) hiding of endowment.
This is a consequence of the fact that predonation of endowment typically affects the
preferences of many more agents than destruction or (perfect) hiding of endowment.
Predonation of endowment can be related to the concept of bribing on which only very
recently some work has been done. Schummer (2000) studied bribe-proof rules in a very
broad class of economies. He showed that if the domain of preferences is sufficiently rich
then any bribe-proof rule is a constant function. Eso˝ and Schummer (2003) studied the
equilibria of a game in the context of a two-bidder, second-price auction where one bidder
may bribe the other to commit to stay away from the auction. Masso´ and Neme (2003)
characterized bribe-proof rules in the context of a division problem with one divisible
good and single-peaked preferences. The two main differences between these papers and
ours are the following. In the first place, a bribe is not shared with other agents, while
in our model a predonation is typically also allocated to a third agent according to a
consumption rule. In the second place, a bribe only leads to a change of the type of the
receiving agent, whereas in our model a predonation may affect other agents’ preferences
as well.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the model and notation.
Moreover, we recall two results on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in the
marriage model, which facilitate the exposition of our proofs. In Section 3, we provide
4For a comprehensive account on manipulation in the marriage model we refer to Roth and Sotomayor
(1990), and for a short review on manipulation of endowments in other contexts we refer to S & O¨-S.
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our characterization results. Finally, in Section 4, we summarize our results and conclude
with some examples and remarks.
2 The model
The model and most of the notation presented next are due to S & O¨-S. We consider two
finite and disjoint sets M = {m1, . . . ,mr} of men and W = {w1, . . . , ws} of women where
possibly r 6= s. Since S & O¨-S need the assumption r, s ≥ 3 for most of their results we
make this assumption from the start. The set A = M ∪W is called a society. For each
agent i ∈ A, we define the potential set of mates as
A (i) :=
{
W ∪ {i} if i ∈M ;
M ∪ {i} if i ∈ W.
Let R+ = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}. For each i ∈ A, let vi : A (i) → R+ be a map that totally
orders A (i) meaning that for each i ∈ A, vi (j) = vi (k) if and only if j = k ∈ A (i). A
valuation profile is a set of maps v = {vi}i∈A.
We will assume that each agent i ∈ A has an initial endowment ei ∈ R+. A vector
e = (ei)i∈A ∈ E := RA+ is called an endowment profile. Endowments are allocated between
matched agents according to some exogenous consumption rule, which for agent i ∈ A is
a function ci : A (i) × E → R+. For any j ∈ A(i) and any e ∈ E, ci(j, e) denotes the
consumption of i when matched to j. We require that the functions {ci}i∈A satisfy the
following three conditions. First, we require that no matter who i’s mate is, he/she does
not consume more than their total endowment, i.e.,
C1: ci (j, e) ≤ ei + ej for all j ∈ A (i) \ {i} and e ∈ E.
Second, every self-matched agent consumes his own endowment, i.e.,
C2: ci (i, e) = ei for all e ∈ E.
The third condition is a combined monotonicity and independency property:
C3: ci (j, e) ≤ ci (j, e′) for all j ∈ A (i) and e, e′ ∈ E with ei ≤ e′i and ej ≤ e′j.
Note that for i ∈ A, j ∈ A(i)\{i} we do not demand feasibility in the sense that ci(j, e)+
cj(i, e) ≤ ei + ej.
Lemma 1 For all i ∈ A and j ∈ A(i)\{i} there exists a non-decreasing function γij :
R+ ×R+ → R+ such that γij (0, 0) = 0 and γij(ei, ej) = ci(j, e) for any e ∈ E.
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Proof. It is straightforward from C1 and C3.
In view of Lemma 1 and condition C2 we conveniently define for any i ∈ A a function
γii : R+ ×R+ → R+ as γii(ei, ei) := ci(i, e) = ei for any e ∈ E. For each agent i ∈ A, we
identify the consumption rule ci with the associated set of functions γ = {γij}j∈A(i) . We
denote by Γ the collection of these associated set of functions γ.
S & O¨-S provided the following examples of consumption rules, which will be discussed
later,
1. Trivial: γijt (ei, ej) = ei for all e ∈ E, i ∈ A, and j ∈ A (i).
2. Reciprocal: γijr (ei, ej) = ej for all e ∈ E, i ∈ A, and j ∈ A (i).
3. Equal share: γije (ei, ej) =
1
2
(ei + ej) for all e ∈ E, i ∈ A, and j ∈ A (i).
4. Maximal: γijmax (ei, ej) = max {ei, ej} for all e ∈ E, i ∈ A, and j ∈ A (i).
5. Minimal: γijmin (ei, ej) = min {ei, ej} for all e ∈ E, i ∈ A, and j ∈ A (i).
6. Public: γiip (ei, ei) = ei, γ
ij
p (ei, ej) = ei + ej for all e ∈ E, i ∈ A, and j ∈ A (i) \ {i}.
A matching problem is given by a quadruple α = (A, e, v, γ) where A is a society, e
is an endowment profile, v is a valuation profile, and γ a consumption rule. Note that
by taking ei = 0 for every i ∈ A we obtain a classical marriage problem (cf. Gale and
Shapley (1962)).
Given a matching problem α = (A, e, v, γ), each agent i ∈ A consumes a pair (j, γij (ei, ej))
which consists of a mate j ∈ A(i) and some amount γij (ei, ej) ∈ R+. The sum vi (j) +
γij (ei, ej) represents i’s quasi-linear utility if he were matched to agent j ∈ A(i). For
each agent i ∈ A, we define a strict rank order, Ri, on the set A (i)×R+ as follows. Let
j, k ∈ A (i), then (j, γij (ei, ej))Ri
(
k, γik (ei, ek)
)
if
vi (j) + γ
ij (ei, ej) > vi (k) + γ
ik (ei, ek) , or
vi (j) + γ
ij (ei, ej) = vi (k) + γ
ik (ei, ek) and vi (j) > vi (k) .
With a slight abuse of notation we sometimes write jRik. Furthermore, for all i ∈ A, Pi
denotes the strict relation of Ri (we need the notation Ri because we will be considering
situations where jRik and j = k).
It is clear that every matching problem α = (A, e, v, γ) induces a matching market
(M,W,P ) (cf. Gale and Shapley (1962)) where P is the profile of strict rank orders as
derived above. Let α = (A, e, v, γ) be a matching problem. An outcome or matching for
α is a bijection µ : A → A such that for all i ∈ A, µ (i) ∈ A (i) and for all i, j ∈ A,
µ (i) = j implies that µ (j) = i. Given i ∈ A and a matching µ, µ (i) is called the mate
of agent i under matching µ. The set of all matchings for A is denoted by MA. We say
that a matching µ ∈MA is individually rational for α if and only if for all i ∈ A we have
that µ (i)Rii. A pair of agents (i, j) blocks a matching µ ∈ MA under α if jPiµ (i) and
4
iPjµ (j). A matching µ ∈ MA is stable for α if and only if it is individually rational for
α and there is no blocking pair (i, j) for µ under α.
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed the existence of a stable matching for every matching
market. Moreover, they proved that there is a stable matching, µM , in which every man
(woman) gets his best (her worst) mate under stable matchings, and there is a, generally
different, stable matching, µW , in which every man (woman) gets his worst (her best)
optimal outcome under stable matchings. Both can be obtained by the so-called deferred
acceptance algorithm (cf. Gale and Shapley (1962)).
A matching rule ϕ is a map that associates with each matching problem α = (A, e, v, γ)
a matching ϕ [α] = µ ∈ MA. We define the man optimal matching rule ϕM as the
matching rule that associates with each matching problem α = (A, e, v, γ) the man optimal
matching µM of the corresponding market, i.e., ϕM [α] = µM . With the obvious change
of roles we define the woman optimal matching rule ϕW .
We use the following two results to establish our characterizations. Theorem 2 tells
us that the man optimal matching mechanism in a matching market makes it a (weakly)
dominant strategy for each man to state his true preferences. Theorem 3 points out what
happens to the optimal matchings in a matching market if some men extend their list of
acceptable women. (Clearly, a similar result to Theorem 3 can be obtained by switching
the roles of men and women.)
Theorem 2 (Dubins and Freedman (1981); Roth (1982); cf. Theorem 4.7 in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990)) Let (M,W,P ) be a matching market. Let P ′ be a profile of rank
orders5 such that for some man m∗ ∈ M it holds that P ′i = Pi, i 6= m∗. Let µM
and µ′M be the man optimal matchings with respect to P and P
′, respectively. Then,
µM(m
∗)Rm∗µ′M(m
∗).
Theorem 3 (Gale and Sotomayor (1985); cf. Theorem 2.24 in Roth and Sotomayor
(1990)) Let (M,W,P ) be a matching market with strict rank orders P . Let M ′ ⊆M . Let
P ′ be a profile of rank orders with P ′i = Pi for all i ∈ W ∪ (M\M ′) and where for any
m′ ∈ M ′, P ′m′ is a strict rank order obtained by adding women to the end of the list of
acceptable women in Pm. Let µM and µ
′
M (µW and µ
′
W ) be the man (woman) optimal
matchings with respect to P and P ′, respectively. Then,
µM(m)Rmµ
′
M(m) and µW (m)Rmµ
′
W (m) for all m ∈M, and
µ′M(w)RwµM(w) and µ
′
W (w)RwµW (w) for all w ∈ W.
3 Manipulation via predonation
Throughout this section we consider a fixed set of agents A. Moreover, we assume that
any consumption rule satisfies conditions C1, C2, and C3. Finally, we focus on the man
optimal matching rule ϕM , as symmetric results for the woman optimal matching rule
ϕW can easily be obtained by changing the roles of men and women.
5Rank orders need not be strict for this result.
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Definition 4 (Sertel and O¨zkal-Sanver (2002)) A matching rule ϕ is manipulable via
predonation by some agent i to some other agent j ∈ A\{i} if and only if there exist two
problems α = (A, e, v, γ) and α′ = (A, e′, v, γ) where e′i < ei, e
′
j = ej + ei − e′i and e′r = er
for all r ∈ A\ {i, j} such that
(iα′ , γ
iiα′ (e′i, e
′
iα′
))Pi
(
iα, γ
iiα (ei, eiα)
)
and
(jα′ , γ
jjα′ (e′j, e
′
jα′
))Rj
(
jα, γ
jjα (ej, ejα)
)
where iα = ϕ [α] (i), jα = ϕ [α] (j), iα′ = ϕ [α
′] (i), and jα′ = ϕ [α′] (j).
In order to characterize the class of consumption rules under which the man optimal
matching rule can be manipulated via predonation of endowment we recall6 from S &
O¨-S the following two slightly technical, but very weak conditions on consumption rules.
For an interpretation of the conditions consider an agent i. For expositional convenience
we assume that i = m ∈ M . The first condition, Relevancy of Endowment (RE(m) for
short), says that m’s endowment matters to some woman, while keeping her endowment
constant. The second condition, Reflexive Relevancy of Endowment (RRE(m) for short),
says that m’s endowment matters to himself, (a) when comparing between the women, or
(b) when comparing between the women on the one side and m being single on the other
side.
Formally, a consumption rule γ satisfies for some i ∈ A condition
RE(i) if there exist j ∈ A(i)\{i} and x, y, z ∈ R+ such that
γji(x, y) 6= γji(x, z).
RRE(i,∼) if (a) there exist j, j′ ∈ A(i)\{i}, j 6= j′, and x, y, z, s ∈ R+ such that7
γij(z, x)− γij(y, x) 6= γij′(z, s)− γij′(y, s)
or (b) there exist j ∈ A(i)\{i} and x, y, z ∈ R+ with y < z such that
γij(z, x)− γij(y, x) ∼ z − y.
The symbol ∼ in the last condition will stand for >, <, or 6=, depending on the type
of predonation, i.e., man to woman, man to man, etc. This turns out not only to be a
concise and convenient way to adapt conditions that S & O¨-S used in their characterization
results, but it also facilitates a comparison of our results with theirs. For instance, they
showed that the man optimal matching rule ϕM is prone to manipulability by a woman
6More precisely, the only condition from S & O¨-S that we generalize is RRE(i, >)(b) by replacing >
with ∼ which will stand for >, <, or 6=. In S & O¨-S conditions RE and RRE were introduced without
further interpretation and called C3 and C∗3 , respectively.
7For convenience, we will assume γij(z, x)− γij(y, x) > γij′(z, s)− γij′(y, s) and y < z.
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hiding (or destroying) her endowment if and only if γ satisfies RE(w) or RRE(w,>) for
some w ∈ W .
S & O¨-S showed that under consumption rules γr, γe, γmax, γmin, and γp the man
optimal matching rule ϕM is manipulable by predonation of endowment from a man to a
woman, a man to another man, a woman to a man, and a woman to another woman. As
we will see, this is a consequence of the fact that each of these consumption rules satisfies
RE(i) for each i ∈ A (as can be verified easily).
Next we will characterize for any of the four cases of predonation the class of con-
sumption rules under which ϕM is manipulable.
3.1 Predonation from man to woman
Let ΓMW be the class of consumption rules γ ∈ Γ for which at least one of the conditions
RE(w) or RRE(w,>) for some w ∈ W holds.
Proposition 5 ϕM is manipulable by some man via predonation to some woman if and
only if γ ∈ ΓMW .
Proof. We will first prove the ‘if’-part by providing examples that show that if one
of the conditions is satisfied then ϕM is manipulable via predonation of endowment by a
man to a woman. All our examples can simply be extended to situations with more men
and women by choosing preferences appropriately. We elaborate only the first example.
Similar procedures for the other examples are left to the reader.
Example RE(w), i.e., γ ∈ ΓMW because there is some w ∈ W for which RE(w) holds.
Without loss of generality we assume w = w1. Then, there is a man, m2 ∈ M , say, and
x, y, z ∈ R+ with z > y, such that
γm2w1(x, z) > γm2w1(x, y). (1)
We now construct two matching problems α = (A, e, v, γ) and α′ = (A, e′, v, γ) where α′
is obtained by means of a predonation from m1 to w1. Let the endowments e and e
′ be
defined by:
• em2 = x, ew1 = y, em1 = z − y, and ei ∈ R+ for all i ∈ A\ {m1,m2, w1},
• e′m1 = 0, e′w1 = z, and e′j = ej for all j ∈ A\ {m1, w1}.
Choose the valuation profile v such that it satisfies the following conditions:8
vm1 (w1) > max
j∈A(m1)\{w1,w2}
{
vm1 (j) + γ
m1j (em1 , ej)
}− γm1w1 (em1 , ew1) , (2)
vm1 (w2) > vm1 (w1) + max
{
γm1w1 (em1 , ew1) , γ
m1w1
(
e′m1 , e
′
w1
)}− γm1w2 (e′m1 , e′w2) , (3)
8To see that such a choice of vm1 is possible, note that we can first choose any value for vm1(m1)
and vm1(wr) (r 6= 1, 2), then vm1(w1) sufficiently large, and finally vm1(w2), also sufficiently large. The
feasibility of the choice of the other valuations can be seen in a similar way. Note also that we can find
vm2 (w2) satisfying (4) and (5) since (1) holds.
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vm2 (w1) > max
j∈A(m2)\{w1,w2}
{
vm2 (j) + γ
m2j (em2 , ej)
}− γm2w1 (em2 , ew1) ,
γm2w1 (em2 , ew1)− γm2w2 (em2 , ew2) < vm2 (w2)− vm2 (w1) , (4)
vm2 (w2)− vm2 (w1) < γm2w1
(
e′m2 , e
′
w1
)− γm2w2 (em2 , ew2) , (5)
vmk (mk) > max
j∈A(mk)\{mk}
{
vmk (j) + γ
mkj
(
e′mk , e
′
j
)}− emk , mk ∈M\ {m1,m2} ,
vw1 (m1) > max
j∈A(w1)\{m1,m2}
{
vw1 (j) + γ
w1j
(
e′w1 , e
′
j
)}− γw1m1 (ew1 , em1) ,
vw1 (m2) > vw1 (m1) + max
{
γw1m1 (ew1 , em1) , γ
w1m1
(
e′w1 , e
′
m1
)}− γw1m2 (ew1 , em2) , (6)
vw2 (m1) > max
j∈A(w2)\{m1,m2}
{
vw2 (j) + γ
w2j (ew2 , ej)
}− γw2m1 (ew2 , e′m1) ,
vw2 (m2) > vw2 (m1) + γ
w2m1 (ew2 , em1)− γw2m2 (ew2 , em2) ,
vwk (wk) > max
j∈A(wk)\{wk}
{
vwk (j) + γ
wkj (ewk , ej)
}− ewk , wk ∈ W\ {w1, w2} .
Then the first positions in the initial preference system can be concisely depicted as
follows:
m1 m2 w1 w2
w2 w2 m2 m2
l w1 l m1
w1 m2 m1 l
m1 w1 w2
(RE(w1))
Here and henceforth we indicate in boldface which positions definitely switch going from
α to α′ due to the choice of e and v. The arrows indicate ‘sufficient distance’ in the
valuations so that after a predonation 1) no agent from the upper (lower) part has moved
to the lower (upper) part, and 2) the utility levels of the upper part are still higher than
the pre-predonation utility levels of the lower part. For instance, the arrow in the first
column depicts conditions (2) and (3), which not only guarantee that w2 remains agent
m1’s favorite mate, but also make sure that the utility from w2 after predonation is still
higher than the utility from any other agent before the predonation. We have left out
any agent not in {m1,m2, w1, w2} because their positions do not influence in the changes
of the man optimal matching.
In matching problem α, the man optimal stable matching µαM is given by
µαM (m1) = w1, µ
α
M (m2) = w2,
µαM (mk) = mk, for all mk ∈M\ {m1,m2} , and
µαM (wk) = wk, for all wk ∈ W\ {w1, w2} ,
whereas in α′, the man optimal stable matching µα
′
M is given by
µα
′
M (m1) = w2, µ
α′
M (m2) = w1,
µα
′
M (mk) = mk, for all mk ∈M\ {m1,m2} , and
µα
′
M (wk) = wk, for all wk ∈ W\ {w1, w2} .
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From (3), (6), and C3 it follows that,
vm1 (w2) + γ
m1w2
(
e′m1 , e
′
w2
)
> vm1 (w1) + γ
m1w1 (em1 , ew1) and
vw1 (m2) + γ
w1m2
(
e′w1 , e
′
m2
)
> vw1 (m1) + γ
w1m1 (ew1 , em1) .
So the predonation from m1 to w1 is indeed profitable:(
w2, γ
m1w2
(
e′m1 , e
′
w2
))
Pm1((w1, γ
m1w1 (em1 , ew1)) and(
m2, γ
w1m2
(
e′w1 , e
′
m2
))
Rw1((m1, γ
w1m1 (ew1 , em1)) .
The remaining cases RRE(w,>)(a) and RRE(w,>)(b) can be analyzed extending the
examples below in the same way as we previously have done for RE(w).
Examples RRE(w,>)(a) and RRE(w,>)(b). Without loss of generality suppose that w =
w1. Let a man, m1, say, predonate to w1. Then the following tables show that this is
profitable for both m1 and w1 if we maintain appropriate distances:
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2
w2 w1 w1 m3 m2
l w2 m3 m2 m1
m1 m2 w2 l l
w1 w1 w2
m1 m3
RRE(w1, >)(a)
j = m2, j
′ = m3
m1 m2 w1 w2
w1 w1 w1 m2
w2 w2 m2 m1
l m2 l l
m1 m1 w2
RRE(w1, >)(b)
j = m2
Now we will prove the ‘only if’-part. Let γ 6∈ ΓMW . Then for any w ∈ W none of the
conditions RE(w) and RRE(w,>) holds.
Consider a problem α = (A, e, v, γ). Suppose some man predonates some amount of
his endowment to some woman. Without loss of generality we assume that m1 predonates
to w1. Let α
′ = (A, e′, v, γ) be the resulting problem. We are done if we prove that m1 is
not strictly better off at α′.
The predonation causes the following changes in the preferences. It follows from [not
RE(w1)] that γ
m1w1(y, x) ≤ γm1w1(z, t) for all x, y, z, t ∈ R+ with y < z and y+x = z+ t.
Hence,
vm1(w1) + γ
m1w1(e′m1 , e
′
w1) ≤ vm1(w1) + γm1w1(em1 , ew1). (7)
From C2 and C3 it follows immediately that
vm1(i) + γ
m1i(e′m1 , e
′
i) ≤ vm1(i) + γm1i(em1 , ei) for all i ∈ A(m1)\{w1}. (8)
It also follows from [not RE(w)] that
vm(i) + γ
mi(e′m, e′i) = vm(i) + γmi(em, ei) for all m ∈M\{m1} and all i ∈ A(m). (9)
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From [not RRE(w1, >)] it follows that z − y ≥ γw1m(z, s) − γw1m(y, s) ≥ γw1m1(z, t) −
γw1m1(y, x) for all m ∈M\ {m1} and x, y, z, t, s ∈ R+ with y < z and y+x = z+ t. Using
these inequalities and again [not RRE(w1, >)] we obtain
(vw1(w1) + e
′
w1) − (vw1(w1) + ew1) ≥ (10)
(vw1(m¯) + γ
w1m¯(e′w1 , e
′
m¯)) − (vw1(m¯) + γw1m¯(ew1 , em¯)) =(
vw1(m˜) + γ
w1m˜(e′w1 , e
′
m˜)
) − (vw1(m˜) + γw1m˜(ew1 , em˜)) ≥
(vw1(m1) + γ
w1m1(e′w1 , e
′
m1)) − (vw1(m1) + γw1m1(ew1 , em1)) for all m¯, m˜ ∈ A(w1)\{w1,m1}.
Condition C3 yields
vw(m1) + γ
wm1(e′w, e′m1) ≤ vw(m1) + γwm1(ew, em1) for all w ∈ W\{w1}. (11)
Note also that
vw(i) + γ
wi(e′w, e′i) = vw(i) + γwi(ew, ei) for all w ∈ W\{w1} and all i ∈ A(w)\{m1}.
(12)
Next let us turn to an interpretation of inequalities (7)-(12). Inequalities (7) and (8)
show us that the utility levels of m1 all may drop, but it does not provide any information
on whether the positions of mates interchange. Equality (9) shows that the rank order of
any other man does not change. From inequality (10) the only possible changes in w1’s
rank order are a descent of m1 and an ascent of w1. Inequalities (11) and (12) show that
the only possible change in a woman’s w 6= w1 rank order is a descent of m1.
Let P 0i and P
3
i denote agent i’s rank order in problems α and α
′, respectively. Note
that P 3w1 can be obtained from P
0
w1
in two steps: first we put m1 in a (weakly) lower
position, and subsequently we put w1 in a (weakly) higher position. Let Q be the rank
order of agent w1 after the first step.
We consider two auxiliary intermediate profiles of rank orders P 1 and P 2 for all agents.
Define P 1m1 := P
0
m1
and P 1i := P
3
i for i ∈ A\{m1, w1}, and P 1w1 := Q. Define P 2m1 := P 0m1
and P 2i := P
3
i for i ∈ A\{m1}. Note that all rank orders are strict; there are no ties. Let
µ0, µ1, µ2, and µ3 denote the man optimal matchings for rank order profiles P 0, P 1, P 2,
and P 3, respectively.
Let m∗ := m1 and denote w∗ := µ0(m∗) ∈ A(m∗). In view of inequality (8) we are
done if we prove that w∗R0m∗µ
3(m∗). This will be done in three steps. First we show
w∗R0m∗µ
1(m∗), then µ1(m∗)R0m∗ µ
2(m∗), and finally µ2(m∗)R0m∗µ
3(m∗). The result then
follows from the transitivity of R0m∗ .
Step 1: Suppose µ1(m∗)P 0m∗w
∗. Then by individual rationality of µ0 at P 0, w˜ :=
µ1(m∗) ∈ W So, w˜P 0m∗w∗R0m∗m∗ and w˜ 6= w∗.
Define a new profile of strict rank orders P¯ 0 as follows. Define P¯ 0i := P
0
i for i 6= m∗,
and let P¯ 0m∗ be such that w˜P¯
0
m∗w
∗R¯0m∗m
∗, [w∗P 0m∗m
∗ implies w∗P¯ 0m∗m
∗], and m∗P¯ 0m∗w for
all w ∈ A(m∗)\{m∗, w˜, w∗}. Similarly, define a profile of rank orders P¯ 1 by P¯ 1i := P 1i for
i 6= m∗ and P¯ 1m∗ := P¯ 0m∗ .
Let µ¯0 and µ¯1 denote the man optimal matchings for rank order profiles P¯ 0 and P¯ 1,
respectively. Recall that for the man optimal matching mechanism it is always a weakly
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dominant strategy for m∗ to state his true rank order (Theorem 2). Assume µ¯0(m∗) 6= w∗.
If µ¯0(m∗)P¯ 0m∗w
∗ then µ¯0(m∗) = w˜. Hence, at P 0 man m∗ can profit by reporting P¯ 0m∗
instead of P 0m∗ , a contradiction to truth-telling being weakly dominant. If w
∗P¯ 0m∗µ¯
0(m∗)
then µ¯0(m∗) = m∗ by individual rationality of µ¯0 at P¯ 0. Hence, at P¯ 0 man m∗ can profit
by reporting P 0m∗ instead of P¯
0
m∗ , again a contradiction to truth-telling being weakly
dominant. Hence, µ¯0(m∗) = w∗. Analogously it follows that µ¯1(m∗) = w˜.
Since w˜P¯ 0m∗w
∗ and µ¯0 is the man optimal matching at P¯ 0 it follows that µ¯1 is not
stable at P¯ 0.
Suppose µ¯1 is not individual rational at P¯ 0. Then there is an agent i 6= m∗ such that
iP¯ 0i µ¯
1(i). If i ∈M then matching µ¯1 is also not individual rational at P¯ 1 since P¯ 0i = P¯ 1i ,
a contradiction. If i ∈ W , then iP¯ 0i µ¯1(i) implies iP¯ 1i µ¯1(i), and again we find that µ¯1 is
also not individual rational at P¯ 1, a contradiction.
Hence, µ¯1 is not stable at P¯ 0 because there exists a blocking pair (m¯, w¯) ∈ M ×W ,
say. So,
m¯P¯ 0w¯µ¯
1(w¯) and (13)
w¯P¯ 0m¯µ¯
1(m¯). (14)
On the other hand, µ¯1 is stable at P¯ 1. Hence,
µ¯1(w¯)P¯ 1w¯m¯ or (15)
µ¯1(m¯)P¯ 0m¯w¯. (16)
(Notice that P¯ 0m¯ = P¯
1
m¯ by construction.) Since (16) contradicts (14) it follows that (15)
holds.
If both m¯, µ¯1(w¯) 6= m∗, then (15) implies µ¯1(w¯)P¯ 0w¯m¯, contradicting (13). If µ¯1(w¯) = m∗
and m¯ 6= m∗, then (13) implies m¯P¯ 1w¯m∗, contradicting (15).
Hence, m¯ = m∗. From (14) it follows that w¯P¯ 0m∗µ¯
1(m∗), contradicting that µ¯1(m∗) = w˜
is m∗’s best choice. This completes the first step.
Step 2: In view of the only difference between the rank orders P 1 and P 2 (less men
acceptable for w1), it follows from Theorem 3 (switching the roles of men and women)
that µ1(m∗)R1m∗µ
2(m∗). Since R1m∗ = R
0
m∗ we conclude µ
1(m∗)R0m∗ µ
2(m∗).
Step 3: It follows from Theorem 2 that µ2(m∗)R2m∗µ
3(m∗). Since R2m∗ = R
0
m∗ it follows
that µ2(m∗)R0m∗µ
3(m∗), completing the proof.
3.2 Predonation from man to man
Let ΓMM be the class of consumption rules γ ∈ Γ for which at least one of the conditions
RE(m) or RRE(m,<) for some m ∈M holds.
Proposition 6 ϕM is manipulable by some man via predonation to some other man if
and only if γ ∈ ΓMM .
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Proof. We will first prove the ‘if’-part by providing examples that show that if one
of the conditions is satisfied then ϕM is manipulable via predonation of endowment by
a man to some other man. All our examples can simply be extended to situations with
more men and women by choosing preferences appropriately.
Examples RE(m), RRE(m,<)(a), and RRE(m,<)(b). Suppose without loss of generality
m = m2. Let m1 predonate some endowment to m2. Then the following tables show that
this is profitable for both m1 and m2 if we maintain appropriate distances:
m1 m2 w1 w2
w1 w1 w1 m2
w2 l m2 m1
l w2 m1 l
m1 m2 w2
RE(m2)
j = w1
m1 m2 w1 w2
w1 w1 m2 m2
l w2 m1 m1
w2 l l w2
m1 m2 w1
RRE(m2, <)(a)
j = w2, j
′ = w1
m1 m2 w1
w1 w1 m2
l m2 m1
m1 l
w1
RRE(m2, <)(b)
j = w1
Now we will prove the ‘only if’-part. Let γ 6∈ ΓMM . Then for any man m ∈ M none
of the conditions RE(m) and RRE(m,<) holds.
Consider a problem α = (A, e, v, γ). Suppose some man predonates some amount
of his endowment to some other man. Without loss of generality we assume that m1
predonates to m2. Let α
′ = (A, e′, v, γ) be the resulting problem. We are done if we prove
that m1 is not strictly better off at α
′.
The predonation causes the following changes in the preferences. It follows from C2
and C3 that
vm1(i) + γ
m1i(e′m1 , e
′
i) ≤ vm1(i) + γm1i(em1 , ei) for all i ∈ A(m1). (17)
It follows from [not RE(m)] that
vw(i) + γ
wi(e′w, e′i) = vw(i) + γwi(ew, ei) for all w ∈ W and all i ∈ A(w). (18)
Note that
vm(i) + γ
mi(e′m, e′i) = vm(i) + γmi(em, ei) for all m ∈M\{m1,m2} and all i ∈ A(m).
(19)
It follows from [not RRE(m2, <)] that
(vm2(w¯) + γ
m2w¯(e′m2 , e
′
w¯)) − (vm2(w¯) + γm2w¯(em2 , ew¯)) = (20)(
vm2(w˜) + γ
m2w˜(e′m2 , e
′
w˜)
) − (vm2(w˜) + γm2w˜(em2 , ew˜)) ≥
(vm2(m2) + e
′
m2) − (vm2(m2) + em2) for all w¯, w˜ ∈ A(m2)\{m2}.
Inequality (17) shows that the utility levels of m1 all may drop, but it does not provide
any information on whether the positions of mates interchange. Equalities (18) and (19)
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say that the rank order of any agent i ∈ A\{m1,m2} does not change. Inequality (20)
establishes that the only possible change in m2’s rank order is a descent of m2.
Let P 0i and P
2
i denote agent i’s rank order in problems α and α
′, respectively.
We consider an auxiliary intermediate profile of rank orders P 1 for all agents. Define
P 1m1 := P
0
m1
and P 1i := P
2
i for i ∈ A\{m1}. Note that all rank orders are strict; there are
no ties. Let µ0, µ1, and µ2 denote the man optimal matchings for rank order profiles P 0,
P 1, and P 2, respectively.
In view of inequality (17) we are done if we prove that µ0(m1)R
0
m1
µ2(m1). This will be
done in two steps. First we show µ0(m1)R
0
m1
µ1(m1) and subsequently µ
1(m1)R
0
m1
µ2(m1).
The result then follows from the transitivity of R0m1 .
Step 1: In view of the only difference between the rank orders P 1 and P 0 (more women
acceptable in m2’s rank order), it follows from Theorem 3 that µ
0(m1)R
0
m1
µ1(m1).
Step 2: It follows from Theorem 2 that µ1(m1)R
1
m1
µ2(m1). Since R
1
m1
= R0m1 it holds
that µ1(m1)R
0
m1
µ2(m1). This completes the proof.
3.3 Predonation from woman to man
Let ΓWM be the class of consumption rules γ ∈ Γ for which at least one of the conditions
RE(i) and RRE(i, >) for some i ∈ A holds.
Proposition 7 ϕM is manipulable by some woman via predonation to some man if and
only if γ ∈ ΓWM .
Proof. We will first prove the ‘if’-part by providing examples that show that if one
of the conditions is satisfied then ϕM is manipulable via predonation of endowment by a
woman to a man. All our examples can simply be extended to situations with more men
and women by choosing preferences appropriately.
Examples RE(m), RE(w), RRE(m,>)(a), RRE(m,>)(b), RRE(w,>)(a), and RRE(w,>)
(b). Suppose without loss of generality that m = m1 and w = w1. Let w1 predonate to m1.
Then the following tables show that this is profitable for both w1 and m1 if we maintain
appropriate distances:
m1 m2 w1 w2
w2 w2 m2 m2
l w1 l m1
w1 l m1 w2
m1 m2 w1
RE(m1)
j = w2
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2
m1 w1 w2 m1 m1
l w2 w1 m3 m2
w1 l l l m3
w2 m2 m3 m2 w2
w1
RE(w1)
j = m2
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m1 m2 w1 w2 w3
w3 w2 m2 m1 m1
w2 w1 l m2 w3
l l w1 w2 m2
m1 m2 m1
w1 w3
RRE(m1, >)(a)
j = w2, j
′ = w3
m1 m2 w1 w2
m1 w2 m1 m1
w2 w1 m2 m2
l l l w2
w1 m2 w1
RRE(m1, >)(b)
j = w2
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w1 w1 w2 m3 m2 m1
l l w1 l m3 w3
w3 w2 l m2 m1 m2
l w3 w3 m1 w2 m3
w2 m2 m3 l
m1 w1
RRE(w1, >)(a)
j = m2, j
′ = m1
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2
m1 w1 w2 m3 m2
l w2 w1 l m3
w1 m2 l m2 w2
w2 m3 w1 m1
m1
RRE(w1, >)(b)
j = m2
Now we will prove the ‘only if’-part. Let γ 6∈ ΓWM . Then for any i ∈ A none of the
conditions RE(i) and RRE(i, >) holds. From [not RE(m)] it follows that γwm(x, y) =
γwm(x, z) for all w ∈ W , m ∈ M , and x, y, z ∈ R+. Hence, for each w ∈ W and each
m ∈ M there exists a function fwm : R+ → R+ such that fwm(x) = γwm(x, z) for all
x, z ∈ R+. From [not RRE(w,>)(a)] it follows that
fwm(x)− fwm(y) = fwm′(x)− fwm′(y) for all w ∈ W,m,m′ ∈M, and x, y ∈ R+. (21)
Since fwm(0) = γwm(0, 0) = 0 for all w ∈ W and m ∈M, (21) yields
fwm(x) = fwm
′
(x) for all w ∈ W,m,m′ ∈M, and x ∈ R+.
So for each w ∈ W there exists a function gw : R+ → R+ such that
gw(x) = fwm(x) = γwm(x, y) = γwm(x, 0) ≤ x for all m ∈M and x, y ∈ R+. (22)
Similarly, [not RE(w)] and [not RRE(m,>)(a)] imply that for each m ∈ M there
exists a function gm : R+ → R+ such that
gm(x) = fmw(x) = γmw(x, y) = γmw(x, 0) ≤ x for all w ∈ W and x, y ∈ R+. (23)
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Consider a problem α = (A, e, v, γ). Suppose some woman predonates some amount
of her endowment to some man. Without loss of generality we assume that w1 predonates
to m1. Let α
′ = (A, e′, v, γ) be the resulting problem. We are done if we prove that w1 is
not strictly better off at α′.
Clearly, (22) and (23) imply that the rank order of any agent i ∈ A\{w1,m1} does
not change. From (22) and [not RRE(w,>)(b)] it follows that the only possible change
in w1’s rank order is a descent of herself (i.e., more men are acceptable now). From (23)
and [not RRE(m,>)(b)] it follows that the only possible change in m1’s rank order is an
ascent of himself (i.e., less women are acceptable now).
Let P 0i and P
2
i denote agent i’s rank order in the initial and new problem, respectively.
We consider an auxiliary intermediate profile of rank orders P 1 for all agents. Define
P 1w1 := P
0
w1
and P 1i := P
2
i for i ∈ A\{w1}. Note that all rank orders are strict; there are
no ties. Let µ0, µ1, and µ2 denote the man optimal matchings for rank order profiles P 0,
P 1, and P 2, respectively.
From (22) it follows that w1’s utility levels all may drop. Hence, we are done if we prove
that µ0(w1)R
0
w1
µ2(w1). This will be done in two steps. First we show µ
0(w1)R
0
w1
µ1(w1)
and subsequently µ1(w1)R
0
w1
µ2(w1). The result then follows from the transitivity of R
0
w1
.
Step 1: In view of the only change in the rank orders P 0 and P 1 (less women acceptable
for m1), it follows from Theorem 3 that µ
0(w1)R
0
w1
µ1(w1).
Step 2: The only difference between the rank orders P 1 and P 2 is that more men are
acceptable for w1. From Theorem 3 (switching the roles of men and women) it follows
that µ1(w1)R
1
w1
µ2(w1). Since R
1
w1
= R0w1 we have µ
1(w1)R
0
w1
µ2(w1), completing the proof.
3.4 Predonation from woman to woman
Let ΓWW be the class of consumption rules γ ∈ Γ for which at least one of the conditions
RE(w) or RRE(w, 6=) for some w ∈ W holds.
Proposition 8 ϕM is manipulable by some woman via predonation to some other woman
if and only if γ ∈ ΓWW .
Proof. We will first prove the ‘if’-part by providing examples that show that if one
of the conditions is satisfied then ϕM is manipulable via predonation of endowment by
a woman to some other woman. All our examples can simply be extended to situations
with more men and women by choosing preferences appropriately.
Examples RE(w), RRE(w, 6=)(a), RRE(w,<)(b), and RRE(w,>)(b). Let w1 predonate
to w2. Then the following tables show that this is profitable for both w1 and w2 if we
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maintain appropriate distances:
m1 m2 w1 w2
m1 w2 m1 m1
w2 w1 m2 l
w1 l l m2
m2 w1 w2
RE(w2)
j = m1
m1 m2 w1 w2
w2 w2 m1 m1
w1 w1 l m2
l m2 m2 l
m1 w1 w2
RRE(w2, 6=)(a)
j = m2, j
′ = m1
m1 w1 w2
w2 m1 m1
w1 l w2
l w1
m1
RRE(w2, <)(b)
j = m1
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3
w2 w2 w2 m1 m1 m1
w1 w1 w3 m3 l m2
w3 w3 w1 l m2 m3
m1 m2 l m2 m3 w3
m3 w1 w2
RRE(w1, >)(b)
j = m2
Now we will prove the ‘only if’-part. Let γ 6∈ ΓWW . Then for any w ∈ W none of the
conditions RE(w) or RRE(w, 6=) holds.
Consider a problem α = (A, e, v, γ). Suppose some woman predonates some amount
of her endowment to some other woman. Without loss of generality we assume that w1
predonates to w2. Let α
′ = (A, e′, v, γ) be the resulting problem. We are done if we prove
that w1 is not strictly better off at α
′.
The predonation causes the following changes in the preferences. It follows from [not
RE(w)] that
vm(i) + γ
mi(e′m, e′i) = vm(i) + γmi(em, ei) for all m ∈M and all i ∈ A(m). (24)
From [not RRE(w, 6=)] it follows that
(vw(m¯) + γ
wm¯(e′w, e′m¯)) − (vw(m¯) + γwm¯(ew, em¯)) = (25)(
vw(m˜) + γ
wm˜(e′w, e′m˜)
) − (vw(m˜) + γwm˜(ew, em˜)) =
(vw(w) + e
′
w) − (vw(w) + ew) for all w ∈ {w1, w2} and all m¯, m˜ ∈M.
Finally note that
vw(i) + γ
wi(e′w, e′i) = vw(i) + γwi(ew, ei) for all w ∈ W\{w1, w2} and all i ∈ A(w). (26)
Equality (24) shows that the utility levels (in particular the rank orders) of the men
do not change. Equality (25) says that although all utility levels of agent w2 (agent w1)
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increase (decrease), her rank order does not change. Finally, equality (26) says that the
utility levels (in particular the rank order) of any woman w ∈ W\{w1, w2} do not change.
Note that the rank orders in the initial and new problem are the same. Hence, the
man optimal matching at α and α′ is also the same. Since all of w1’s utility levels (weakly)
drop it follows immediately that w1 is not strictly better off at α
′.
4 Concluding remarks
We have summarized our main results in Table 1. The result in S & O¨-S that each of the
consumption rules γr, γe, γmax, γmin, and γp is manipulable in any of the four cases follows
easily from the observation that these consumption rules satisfy RE(i) for each i ∈ A.
Notice that if a consumption rule allows manipulation by a man via predonation to a
woman then it also allows manipulation by a woman via predonation to a man and by a
woman via predonation to a woman, and vice versa, i.e., ΓMW = ΓWM ∩ΓWW . Switching
the roles of men and women in Table 1, we obtain a characterization of the consumption
rules that allow for manipulation of the woman optimal matching rule ϕW .
Type of predonation Domain of consumption rules under which ϕM is manipulable
man to woman ΓMW = {γ ∈ Γ : γ satisfies RE(w) or RRE(w,>) for some w ∈ W}
man to man ΓMM = {γ ∈ Γ : γ satisfies RE(m) or RRE(m,<) for some m ∈M}
woman to man ΓWM = {γ ∈ Γ : γ satisfies RE(i) or RRE(i, >) for some i ∈ A}
woman to woman ΓWW = {γ ∈ Γ : γ satisfies RE(w) or RRE(w, 6=) for some w ∈ W}
Table 1: Domains of manipulating ϕM via predonation
In Table 2 we present for each particular type of predonation an example of a con-
sumption rule under which the man optimal matching rule cannot be manipulated.
Type of predonation ϕM not manipulable under consumption rule
man to woman γwm = γwmp , γ
mw = γmwt , w ∈ W,m ∈M
man to man γwm = γwmt , γ
mw = γmwp , w ∈ W,m ∈M
woman to man γij (ei, ej) = ei/2 for all i ∈ A, j ∈ A(i)\ {i}
woman to woman γwm = γwmp , γ
mw = γmwt , w ∈ W,m ∈M
Table 2: Consumption rules under which ϕM is not manipulable
S & O¨-S pointed out that under the trivial consumption rule γt the man (or woman)
optimal matching rule is non-manipulable by predonation of any agent (man or woman) to
any other agent (man or woman). One may wonder whether it is the unique consumption
rule with this property. The next corollary answers this question in the affirmative.
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Corollary 9 The only consumption rule under which ϕM cannot be manipulated by any
agent via predonation to any other agent is the trivial consumption rule, i.e., γijt (x, y) = x
for all i ∈ A, j ∈ A (i) , and x, y ∈ R+.
Proof. It remains to prove that there is no other consumption rule with this property.
Let γ be a consumption rule under which ϕM is non-manipulable. Then γ 6∈ ΓWM ∪
ΓWW ∪ ΓMM . Since γ /∈ ΓWM it follows from the proof of Proposition 7 that for each
i ∈ A there exists a function gi : R+ → R+ with
gi(0) = 0 and gi(x) = γij(x, y) ≤ x for all j ∈ A(i)\ {i} and x, y ∈ R+.
Moreover, as γ /∈ ΓWW , [not RRE(w, 6=)] implies that gw(x) = x for all w ∈ W and
x ∈ R+. Similarly, as γ /∈ ΓMM , [not RRE(m,<)] implies that gm(x) = x for all m ∈ M
and x ∈ R+. Hence, γ = γt.
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